We study bribing in a sequential team contest with multiple pairwise battles. We allow for asymmetries in winning … prizes and marginal costs of effort; and we characterize the conditions under which (i) a player in a team is offered a bribe … by the owner of the other team and (ii) she accepts the bribe. We show that these conditions depend on the ratios of …

such as race, gender, or ethnicity is much less acceptable. Why? I develop a simple rent-seeking model of conflict which is …

We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, two groups compete for the …, that the opposition can either accept, or reject and wage conflict. Expropriating a large share of resources increases … of conflict. In equilibrium, allocations are non-monotonic in the cost of mobility. Moreover, limited commitment with …

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members' efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …

conflict and more intense fighting. …