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Amegashie, J. Atsu - 2008

History is replete with overt discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, citizenship, ethnicity, marital status, academic performance, health status, volume of market transactions, religion, sexual orientation, etc. However, these forms of discrimination are not equally tolerable. For...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264357

An experimental investigation of colonel blotto games

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2009

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265974

Balanced Scorecards : A Relational Contract Approach

Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - 2021

performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are non-verifiable so that … measurements), the optimal self-enforcing (relational) contract between a principal and a multitasking agent is an index contract …. The weights reflect a trade-off between distortion and precision for the measures. The efficiency of the contract improves …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013243235

Succession rules and leadership rents

Konrad, Kai A.; Skaperdas, Stergios - 2005

Leaders compensate supporters not just for performing their duties but also in order to preempt an overthrow by the same supporters. We show how succession rules affect the power of leaders relative to supporters as well as the resources expended on possible succession struggles. We compare two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261326

Let's (Not) Escalate This! Leadership and Communication in a Group Contest

Heine, Florian; Riedl, Arno - 2025

Economic and social situations where groups have to compete are ubiquitous. Such group contests create both a coordination problem within and between groups. Introducing leaders may help to mitigate these coordination problems. However, little is known about the effect of leadership in group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015339499

Building an Equilibrium : Rules Versus Principles in Relational Contracts

Gibbons, Robert - 2020

, we explore how parties establish such relational contracts, whether they achieve efficient cooperation, and how they … adapt to exogenous shocks. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that basing a relational contract on general principles … actions that are consistent with what their relational contract prescribes. To investigate whether there is a causal link …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012847369

Bribing in Team Contests

Dogan, Serhat - 2020

We study bribing in a sequential team contest with multiple pairwise battles. We allow for asymmetries in winning prizes and marginal costs of effort; and we characterize the conditions under which (i) a player in a team is offered a bribe by the owner of the other team and (ii) she accepts the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012841589

Political parties and network formation

Miettinen, Topi; Poutvaara, Panu - 2006

We argue that anticorruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anticorruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261414

Can lower tax rates be bought? Business rent-seeking and tax competition among US States

Chirinko, Robert S.; Wilson, Daniel J. - 2010

The standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly benevolent, acting solely to maximize the utility of the representative resident in their jurisdiction. We depart from this assumption by allowing for the possibility that policymakers also may be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270483

The Dynastic Transmission of Power, Exit Options and the Coevolution of Rent-Seeking Elites

Silve, Arthur; Verdier, Thierry - 2023

We introduce a dynamic model that investigates the persistence and evolution of elite-dominated societies, where inherited political capital determines one’s social standing. Our analysis highlights the critical role of the distribution of exit options in the evolution of political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014356609