derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …

, competition does not eliminate but rather exacerbates inefficiencies arising from contracting with focused agents. Common contract …

expectations of partners in a JL contract, and shame from falling short of normatively inadequate effort, under public repayment of … large treatment effects and confirms the central roles of guilt and shame. Under private repayment, a JL contract increases … effort by almost 100% relative to an IL contract. Under public repayment, effort levels are comparable under IL and JL …

performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are non-verifiable so that … the contracting parties must rely on self-enforcement. Under commonly invoked assumptions (including normally distributed … measurements), the optimal self-enforcing (relational) contract between a principal and a multitasking agent is an index contract …

Advantageous (or propitious) selection occurs when an increase in the premium of an insurance contract induces high … face two mutually exclusive risks that are bundled together in a single insurance contract. We exemplify this last case … to provide an example of a contract facing advantageous selection …