at a fixed price before an auction. In the “Buy-It-Now” format, the seller has the bargaining power and offers a price … prior to the auction; whereas in the “Sell-It-Now” format, it is the buyer. Both formats are extensively used in online and … auction. …

. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …Overbidding in second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We …

seller’s private signal. A public reserve price is announced before the auction starts, and a secret reserve price is … disclosed after the highest bid has been reached. The public reserve price regime may warrant a distortion as a good seller type … may have to increase the reserve price beyond payo˙-maximization in order to be able to credibly signal her type. We …

overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay and the first-price winner-pay auction. Both risk and …. Indeed, we find that spite is a more convincing explanation for bidding behavior for the second-price all-pay auction. Not … predictions in the second-price all-pay auctions for spiteful preferences are different than those for risk averse preferences …

. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …Overbidding in second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We …

exists in the second-price auction and the English auction. We establish there is no equivalence between these two auction … their types. This leads to a strictly higher expected revenue in the second-price auction than in the English auction. Our …We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer …

information’ assumption. The ad value is characterized by a tractable analytical solution given observed auction parameters. Using … Yahoo! search auction data, we estimate value distributions and study the bidding behavior across product categories. We …

a reservation bid for low-price auctions. Extending results from the empirical auction literature and employing a …This paper proposes a framework for demand estimation with data on bids, bidders' identities, and auction covariates … dynamic auction model with IPV and private bidding costs it follows that if participation is optimal the bidder searches with …

We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the … participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We show that this … auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. When the bidders’ sensibility for the signaling concern is …

We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential …