In the seminal rational inattention model of Matĕjka and McKay (2015), logit demand arises from the discrete choice of agents who are uncertain about choice payoffs and who have access to a flexible, costly information acquisition technology (RI-logit). A notable limitation of this powerful...

Empirical evidence shows that the perception of information is strongly concentrated in those environments in which a mass of producers and users of knowledge interact through a distribution medium. This paper considers the consequences of this fact for economic equilibrium analysis. In...

We study how background health risk affects financial risk-taking. We elicit financial risk-taking behavior of a representative sample of more than 5,000 Germans in five panel waves during the COVID-19 pandemic. Exploiting variation in local infections across time and space, we find that an...

We show that the disposition effect–the tendency of investors to hold losers and sell winners–can be a source of overconfidence. We find experimental evidence that individuals update beliefs about their own investment ability based on realized gains and losses rather than the overall...

We show theoretically that the weak transmission of beliefs to actions induces a strong bias in basic asset pricing tests. In particular, expected returns can appear to decline in risk when investors weakly transmit their payoff expectations into willingness to pay. We experimentally test this...

The adaptive learning approach has been fruitfully employed to model the formation of aggregate expectations at the macroeconomic level, as an alternative to rational expectations. This paper uses adaptive learning to understand, instead, the formation of expectations at the micro-level, by...

We investigate the dynamics of prices, information and expectations in a competitive, noisy, dynamic asset pricing equilibrium model. We show that prices are farther away from (closer to) fundamentals compared with average expectations if and only if traders over- (under-) rely on public...