performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are non-verifiable so that … measurements), the optimal self-enforcing (relational) contract between a principal and a multitasking agent is an index contract …. The weights reflect a trade-off between distortion and precision for the measures. The efficiency of the contract improves …

, competition does not eliminate but rather exacerbates inefficiencies arising from contracting with focused agents. Common contract …

Trust between parties should drive the negotiation and design of contract: if parties did not trust each others … over time, we find that lower trust increases contract completeness. Not only contract complexity but also the verifiable …

adapt to exogenous shocks. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that basing a relational contract on general principles … actions that are consistent with what their relational contract prescribes. To investigate whether there is a causal link …

derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …

), 552-80, to derive a new prediction regarding how the productivity of a firm affects its choice between vertical … robust firm-level evidence from Spain showing that, in line with our prediction, the effect of productivity works more …

each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal …, while worse social relationships may increase productivity and players' utility in equilibrium. …