Bayesian updating is the dominant theory of learning. However, the theory is silent about how individuals react to events that were previously unforeseeable or unforeseen. Building on a recently developed axiomatic framework to analyze such situations, we test if subjects update their beliefs...

A pre-condition for employer learning is that signals at labor market entry do not fully reveal graduates’ productivity. I model various distinct sources of signal imperfection—such as noise and multi-dimensional types—and characterize their implications for the private return to skill...

Unfavorable news are often delivered under the disguise of vagueness. But are people sufficiently naive to be fooled by such positive spin? We use a theoretical model and a laboratory experiment to study the strategic use of vagueness in a voluntary disclosure game. Consider a sender who aims at...

Employing an endogenous growth model with human capital, this paper explores how productivity shocks in the goods and human capital producing sectors contribute to explaining aggregate fluctuations in output, consumption, investment and hours. Given the importance of accounting for both the...

We propose two novel methods to "bring ABMs to the data". First, we put forward a new Bayesian procedure to estimate the numerical values of ABM parameters that takes into account the time structure of simulated and observed time series. Second, we propose a method to forecast aggregate time...

This paper proposes a Bayesian estimation framework for panel-data sets with binary dependent variables where a large number of cross-sectional units is observed over a short period of time, and cross-sectional units are interdependent in more than a single network domain. The latter provides...

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of...

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally's enemy. There is a signaling game between the third party and her ally's enemy...

We experimentally study settings where an individual may have an incentive to adopt negative beliefs about another’s intentions in order to justify egoistic behavior. Our first study uses a game in which a player can take money from an opponent in order to prevent the opponent from...