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on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous … sacrifice') which is derived from the egalitarian-equivalent concept suggested by Moulin (1987). We also develop a simple core … test by which it can be checked whether a given allocation is in the core thus being a possible outcome of a cooperative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270530
The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a … incentive compatible core can be empty, even if utility functions are quasi-linear. If, in addition to quasi-linearity, further … assumptions are made (like independent private values), the non-emptiness of the core follows nevertheless from d?Aspremont and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273735
) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273875
The effectiveness of social interaction depends strongly on an ability to coordinate actions efficiently. In large networks, such coordination may be very difficult to achieve and may depend on the communication technology and the network structure. We examine how pre-play communication and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866385
The purpose of this paper is to model the influence of Kantian moral scruples in a dynamic environment. Our objectives are two-fold. Firstly, we investigate how a Nash equilibrium among agents who have moral scruples may ensure that the exploitation of a common property renewable resource is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012860769
We propose a novel tournament design that incorporates the main properties of a round-robin tournament, a Swiss tournament, and a race. Following an equilibrium analysis, we compare 36 tournament structures inherent in our model and several well-known tournament models from the literature, on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314802
Repeated interactions provide a prominent but paradoxical hypothesis for human cooperation in one-shot interactions 1–3. Intergroup competitions 4–7 provide a different hypothesis that is intuitively appealing but heterodox. We show that neither mechanism reliably supports the evolution of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014240476
The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264274
We develop a theoretical framework for equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a fully representative voting body delegates decision-making to a subset of the members, as describes, e.g., the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Three equity concepts are proposed: ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328764
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352382