Inspired by empirical evidence from the oil market, we build a model of an oligopoly facing a fringe as well as competition from renewable resources. We explore different subclasses of HARA utility functions (Cobb-Douglas, power and quadratic utility) to check the robustness of results found in...

The objective of this paper is to critically assess the use of simple rules for the social cost of carbon (SCC) that employ a rudimentary form of the Ramsey Rule. Two interrelated caveats apply. First, if climate change poses a serious problem, it is hard to justify an exogenous constant growth...

We show that OPEC’s market power contributes to global warming by enabling producers of relatively expensive and dirty oil to start producing before OPEC reserves are depleted. We fully characterize the equilibrium of a cartel-fringe model and use a calibration to examine the importance of...

We examine the profitability of cross-ownership in an oligopolistic industry where firms compete as Cournot rivals. We consider a symmetric cross-ownership structure in which a subset of k firms engage in cross-shareholding and each firm has an equal silent financial interest in the other firms,...

Inspired by empirical evidence from the oil market, we build a model of an oligopoly facing a fringe as well as competition from renewable resources. We explore different subclasses of HARA utility functions (Cobb-Douglas, power and quadratic utility) to check the robustness of results found in...

A rapidly rising carbon tax leads to faster extraction of fossil fuels and accelerates global warming. We analyze how general equilibrium effects operating through the international capital market affect this Green Paradox. In a two-region, two-period world with identical homothetic preferences...

The effects of climate policies are often studied under the assumption of perfectly competitive markets for fossil fuels. In this paper, we allow for monopolistic fossil fuel supply. We show that, if fossil and renewable energy sources are perfect substitutes, a phase will exist during which the...

This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We...

We examine the profitability of cross-ownership in an oligopolistic industry where firms compete as Cournot rivals. We consider a symmetric cross-ownership structure in which a subset of k firms engage in cross-shareholding and each firm has an equal silent financial interest in the other firms,...

Consider a situation in which countries anticipate an international environmental agreement (IEA) to be in effect sometime in the future. What is the impact of the future IEA on current emissions after its announcement? We show that the answer to this question is ambiguous. We examine four types...