France has a very ambitious environmental-policy agenda, aimed chiefly at cutting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions but also at dealing with local air and water pollution, waste management and the conservation of biodiversity. The laws that followed the Grenelle de l'environnement encompass policy...

We set up a static model of electricity provision in which delivery to consumers is only imperfectly reliable. Blackouts can be either rolling or systemic; in both cases a price cap becomes active on the wholesale market. We show that for any given value of the price cap, one can decentralize...

Rebates that reward economic agents if they meet a minimum conservation threshold are a popular policy to encourage energy conservation. However, most threshold-based rebates are structured such that they do not encourage reduction beyond the threshold. In this paper, I show theoretically that...

Rebates that reward economic agents if they meet a minimum conservation threshold are a popular policy to encourage energy conservation. However, most threshold-based rebates are structured such that they do not encourage reduction beyond the threshold. In this paper, I show theoretically that...

Markets for environmental externalities are typically closely related to the markets causing such externalities, whereupon strategic interaction may result. Along these lines, the market for Tradable Green Certificates (TGCs) is strongly interwoven in the electricity market as the producers of...

A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...

I extend multi-unit auction estimation techniques to a setting in which firms can express cost complementarities over time. In the context of electricity markets, I show how the auction structure and bidding data can be used to estimate these complementarities, which in these markets arise due...

This paper presents new evidence on the question: Why don’t consumers switch electricity contracts? By conducting a large-scale survey experiment with 3% of the Danish working-age population, I have gathered data on respondents’ factual knowledge of the retail electricity market, their...

This paper analyses an electricity market in which a monopolist that employs fossil-fuel base-load and peak-load technologies competes against a fringe of renewable energy (RE) generators. The optimal technology and electricity mix can be decentralised by levying technology-dependent capacity...