Showing 1 - 10 of 2,094
This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917514
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054012
This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects' costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060963
in an experiment. Our data show that indeed, strengthening weaker contestants through tie-breaks and bid …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986649
We use a unique hand collected data set of 6 258 auctions from the online football manager game Hattrick to study micro-patterns of reserve price formation. We find that chosen reserve prices exhibit both, very sophisticated and 'irrational' behavior by the sellers. Reserve prices pick up the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316493
laboratory experiment. In theory, the chopstick auction has an efficient equilibrium and is revenue equivalent with the second … called the 'chopstick auction' in which bidders are confronted with the exposure problem. We do so both in theory and in a …-price sealed-bid auction in which the exposure problem is not present. In the experiment, however, we find that the 'chopstick …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317485
We analyze the revenue-enhancing potential of favoring specific contestants in complete information all-pay auctions and lottery contests with several heterogeneous contestants. Two instruments of favoritism are considered: head starts that are added to the bids of specific contestants and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963772
We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947451
I examine sequential round-robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players. Each player is matched once with each other player. If the matches are organized as Tullock contests (all-pay auctions), the tournament will be almost fair (highly discriminatory): subject to the position of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956804
Auctions of government bonds are the main allotment method used by the Treasury of advanced economies. Previous research has found that auctions have an influence on the market yield days before they take place, and underpricing is usually spotted when their outcome is compared with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021758