Similar Search Results

Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control

Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2021

by eroding motivation. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding …-out if individuals differ in their propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information. Not being controlled …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315983

Market Competition and Efficient Cooperation

Brandts, Jordi - 2017

effects of participation in markets on non-market activities requiring cooperation. In our setup, market interaction takes …-Strangers. We compare the efficiency of cooperation with and without market experience controlling for earnings, allowing us to … effect on cooperation efficiency in Market-Partners, that is among those who had to compete with each other on on the same …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970051

Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts

Wärneryd, Karl - CESifo - 2014

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086457

A Theory of Reciprocity

Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - CESifo - 2001

This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765909

The Non-Constant-Sum Colonel Blotto Game

Roberson, Brian - 2008

The Colonel Blotto game is a two-player constant-sum game in which each player simultaneously distributes her fixed level of resources across a set of contests. In the traditional formulation of the Colonel Blotto game, the players' resources are quot;use it or lose itquot; in the sense that any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012770491

Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts

MacLeod, W. Bentley - 2008

This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774263

Collusive Tax Evasion and Social Norms

Abraham, Martin; Lorek, Kerstin; Richter, Friedemann; … - CESifo - 2015

, whereas social norms need to be internalized to change the behavior of taxpayers who evade taxes unobservedly. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011122686

Just Hire your Spouse! Evidence from a Political Scandal in Bavaria

Kauder, Björn; Potrafke, Niklas - CESifo - 2014

We investigate a case of political favoritism. Some members of the Bavarian parliament hired relatives as office employees who were paid using taxpayers’ money. We examine whether being involved in the scandal influenced re-election prospects and voter turnout. The results do not show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877687

Does the John Bates Clark Medal Boost Subsequent Productivity and Citation Success?

Chan, Ho Fai; Frey, Bruno S.; Gallus, Jana; Torgler, Benno - CESifo - 2013

Despite the social importance of awards, they have been largely disregarded by academic research in economics. This paper investigates whether a specific, yet important, award in economics, the John Bates Clark Medal, raises recipients’ subsequent research activity and status compared to a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877716

Awards as Signals

Frey, Bruno S.; Neckermann, Susanne - CESifo - 2010

Awards are widespread in all countries and are prevalent both in the public sphere and in the private sector. This paper argues, and empirically supports, that awards serve public functions and economists should take them seriously. Using a unique cross-country data set, we suggest that awards...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727309