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Anticipated International Environmental Agreements

Acikgoz, Omer - 2016

Consider a situation in which countries anticipate an international environmental agreement (IEA) to be in effect sometime in the future. What is the impact of the future IEA on current emissions after its announcement? We show that the answer to this question is ambiguous. We examine four types...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012977180

Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements and Trade : Taxes Versus Caps

Eichner, Thomas - 2014

This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013046588

The Fatter the Tail, the Fatter the Climate Agreement - Simulating the Influence of Fat Tails in Climate Change Damages on the Success of International Climate Negotiations

Dekker, Thijs; Dellink, Rob; Ketterer, Janina - 2021

International climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate change are very large. In this paper, we examine the influence of increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages, also known as the ‘fat tail’, on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315816

Stable Climate Coalitions (Nash) and International Trade

Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rudiger - 2021

non-coalition countries with regard to emissions and welfare and compare business as usual with the coalition … liberalization by moving from autarky to free trade. Although the coalition steps up its mitigation effort, world emissions rise … environment as well as for the coalition countries’ welfare and the aggregate welfare of all countries; it reduces the range of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315868

Forging a Global Environmental Agreement Through Trade Sanctions on Free Riders?

Eichner, Thomas - 2015

restored by suitable intra-coalition transfers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013020519

Climate Treaties and Approaching Catastrophes

Barrett, Scott - 2021

If the threshold that triggers climate catastrophe is known with certainty, and the benefits of avoiding catastrophe are high relative to the costs, treaties can easily coordinate countries’ behavior so as to avoid the threshold. Where the net benefits of avoiding catastrophe are lower,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315826

Bringing the Copenhagen Global Climate Change Negotiations to Conclusion

Whalley, John; Walsh, Sean - 2021

In this paper we discuss the global negotiations now underway and aimed at achieving new climate change mitigation and other arrangements after 2012 (the end of the Kyoto commitment period). These were initiated in Bali in December 2007 and are scheduled to conclude by the end of 2009 in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316450

Global Environmental Agreements and International Trade : Asymmetry of Countries Matters

Eichner, Thomas - 2014

climate damage asymmetry tends to discourage cooperation in the grand coalition. The effects of fuel-demand asymmetry depend … on fossil fuel abundance. If fuel is very abundant, the grand coalition fails to be stable independent of the degree of … higher degrees of asymmetry stabilize the grand coalition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013043602

Cooperation on Climate-Change Mitigation

Mason, Charles F. - 2016

We model countries' choice of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a dynamic game. Emissions generate immediate benefits to the emitting country but also increase atmospheric GHG concentrations that negatively affect present and future welfare of all countries. Because there are no international...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012998790

Self-Enforcing Environmental Agreements and International Trade

Eichner, Thomas - 2013

In the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994; Rubio and Ulph 2006) the number of signatories of self-enforcing IEAs does not exceed three, if non-positive emissions are ruled out. We extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086051