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employee’s performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation …? Suppose a manager’s evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal’s scope … for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315592
evaluation indicates bad performance. The justification assures the agent that the principal has not distorted the evaluation …Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal’s evaluation is private information, but … she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justification, her message …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781550
I analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent and can influence the agent's marginal return of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012966930
. Furthermore, since some workers do not reciprocate the principal's altruism, the principal may find it optimal to write a contract … that simultaneously signals his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types. Such a contract is characterized by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121201
This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately-observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013018191
We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938445
This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the … bargaining power, the contract in the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution yields a more efficient outcome and induces more effort. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048890
in quantity and quality of output. We use data from a controlled field experiment that changed the communication of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315929
We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensation-based and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the manager's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013146792
We present a model in which a motivator can take costly actions - or what we call motivational effort - in order to reduce the effort costs of a worker, and analyze the optimal combination of motivational effort and monetary incentives. We distinguish two cases. First, the firm owner chooses the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013057261