risk aversion, the higher the agency costs for delegation and hence the less profitable is a flexible contract versus a … rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by the agent, but also … play then an important role in determining the costs of delegation. The main focus of the paper lies indeed in the analysis …

Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic … effect which reduces an inefficient agent's take-the-money-and-run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control …, it is optimal when uncertainty about operational efficiency is large. Moreover, delegation is more effective with …

Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic … effect which reduces an inefficient agent’s take-the-money-and-run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control …, it is optimal when uncertainty about operational efficiency is large. Moreover, delegation is more effective with …

a fraction of the transfer. The government faces a trade-off in its delegation decision: bureaucrats have knowledge of … incentives to delegate. Furthermore, we discuss how partial delegation, i.e., delegation followed by laws and regulations that … restrict bureaucratic discretion, increases the scope of delegation. We characterize the optimal delegation rule and show that …

. Anticipating the reactions of MJEs to the introduction of FA requires considering delegation and incentivisation, because …