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Bargaining with a Residual Claimant : An Experimental Study

Embrey, Matthew - 2014

We experimentally investigate a bargaining environment in which players negotiate over a fixed payment to one player, while the other player receives the residual from a random pie realization after subtracting the fixed payment. Contrary to the intuition that risk exposure is detrimental, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013040490

Evaluating Market Consolidation in Mobile Communications

Genakos, Christos - 2017

We study the dual relationship between market structure and prices and between market structure and investment in mobile telecommunications. Using a uniquely constructed panel of mobile operators' prices and accounting information across 33 OECD countries between 2002 and 2014, we document that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012953486

Liberation Technology : Mobile Phones and Political Mobilization in Africa

Manacorda, Marco - 2016

lightning strikes. The results are in line with insights from a network model with imperfect information and strategic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012988970

Strategic Complexities in the Combinatorial Clock Auction

Gretschko, Vitali; Knapek, Stephan; Wambach, Achim - 2021

In recent years, regulatory bodies in Europe and around the world implemented Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCA) to allocate scarce and valuable spectrum frequencies usage rights. Although the auction design is complex, the promise is that bidding becomes simple. More precisely, bidders may bid...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315845

Moral Hazard and Bargaining Over Incentive Contracts

Dittrich, Marcus - 2014

This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker's effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048890

Would Global Patent Protection Be Too Weak Without International Coordination?

Lai, Edwin L.-C. - 2011

This paper analyzes the setting of national patent policies in the global economy. In the standard model with free trade and social-welfare-maximizing governments à la Grossman and Lai (2004), cross-border positive policy externalities induce individual countries to select patent strengths that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013122389

Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputation

Forges, Françoise - 2014

Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055418

The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies With and Without Indivisibilities

Forges, Françoise - 2021

The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a socially designed characteristic function, which expresses the fact that coalitions allocate goods by means of random incentive compatible mechanisms. We first survey some results in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317636

How Social Reputation Networks Interact with Competition in Anonymous Online Trading : An Experimental Study

Bolton, Gary E. - 2014

that a reliable reputation network can largely reduce the advantage of partners networks (where a buyer and a seller can …Many Internet markets rely on quot;feedback systemsquot;, essentially social networks of reputation, to facilitate … networks interact in a series of laboratory online markets, where sellers face a moral hazard. We find that competition in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012751561

Can Competition Spoil Reciprocity? - A Laboratory Experiment

Bauernschuster, Stefan; Falck, Oliver; Große, Niels D. - 2021

This paper investigates how group membership and competition among trustors interact with trust and trustworthiness in a laboratory one-shot trust game. To analyze these effects, we apply a 2x2 design. We induce group membership by letting subjects play coordination games with clear focal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316267