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The Political Economy of Post-Compulsory Education Policy with Endogenous Credit Constraints
Anderberg, Dan - 2008
Altruistic parents, who differ in income, make financial transfers to their children, who differ in ability. The children invest in post-compulsory education, subject to an endogenous credit constraint, and taking policy as given. There are two policy tools: a subsidy to those who participate in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012771859
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Childcare Costs and the Demand for Children - Evidence from a Nationwide Reform
Mörk, Eva; Sjögren, Anna; Svaleryd, Helena - 2021
Exploiting the exogenous variation in childcare costs caused by a Swedish childcare reform, we are able to identify the … causal effect of childcare costs on fertility in a context in which childcare enrollment is almost universal, user fees are … low, and the labor force participation of mothers is very high. Anticipation of a reduction in childcare costs increased …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316146
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Intergovernmental Grants as Signals and the Alignment Effect: Theory and Evidence
Bracco, Emanuele; Lockwood, Benjamin; Porcelli, Francesco; … - CESifo - 2015
This paper provides a simple political agency model to explain the effect of political alignment between different tiers of government on intergovernmental grants and election outcomes. Key features of the model are: (i) rational voters interpret public good provision as a signal of incumbent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011167132
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Immunity
Reddy, Karthik; Schularick, Moritz; Skreta, Vasiliki - CESifo - 2013
Legal provisions that protect politicians from arrest and prosecution exist throughout much of the modern democratic world. Why, and with what effects, do societies choose to place their politicians above the law? We examine the institution of immunity both theoretically and empirically. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877744
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Political Competition, Tax Salience and Accountability: Theory and Some Evidence from Italy
Bracco, Emanuele; Porcelli, Francesco; Redoano, Michela - CESifo - 2013
This paper argues that high political competition does not necessarily induce policy makers to perform better as previous research has shown. We develop a political economy model and we show that when political competition is tight, and elected politicians can rely on more tax instruments, they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877811
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Information, Polarization and Delegation in Democracy
Schultz, Christian - CESifo - 2003
This paper investigates the merits of different democratic institutions when politics is uni-dimensional, there is uncertainty both about the preferences of the future electorate and the future polarization of political parties, and politicians have better information about the state of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094160
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Lame Ducks and Divided Government: How Voters Control the Unaccountable
Schelker, Mark - CESifo - 2011
Divided government is not only the outcome of moderate voters’ electoral decision to balance party ideology in government, but a more general reaction of voters to a systematic control problem. Voters realize that term limited executives (i.e., “lame ducks”) cannot be held accountable due...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009221553
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Lexicographic Voting
Klingelhöfer, Jan - CESifo - 2012
This paper reconsiders the division of the literature on electoral competition into models with forward-looking voters and those with backward-looking voters by combining ideas from both strands of the literature. As long as there is no uncertainty about voters’ policy preferences and parties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010539147
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Federalism and Accountability with Distorted Election Choices
Kessing, Sebastian - CESifo - 2009
accountability. Such distorted election choices interact with the architecture of government. Contrasting centralized with … decentralized political systems, this study shows that centralization is likely to result in higher accountability if election …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583637
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Terrorism Prevention and Electoral Accountability
Dragu, Tiberiu; Polborn, Mattias - CESifo - 2009
How does electoral accountability affect the effectiveness of terrorism prevention in a democ- racy? We analyze the … connection between electoral accountability and policy effectiveness in the context of terrorism prevention. We develop a formal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596575