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Centralised Labour Market Negotiations
Müller, Julia - 2013
efficiently according to the familiar Nash bargaining solution, we show that central negotiations lead to a lower employment level …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013072513
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Wage and Employment Effects of Non-Binding Minimum Wages
Dittrich, Marcus - 2010
bargaining models between unions and firms. While the Nash bargaining solution is unaffected by minimum wages below initially … bargained wages, we show that such minimum wages can drive up wages – and be harmful to employment – when bargaining follows the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139416
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Would Global Patent Protection Be Too Weak Without International Coordination?
Lai, Edwin L.-C. - 2011
This paper analyzes the setting of national patent policies in the global economy. In the standard model with free trade and social-welfare-maximizing governments à la Grossman and Lai (2004), cross-border positive policy externalities induce individual countries to select patent strengths that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013122389
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Optimal Tariffs, Retaliation and the Welfare Loss from Tariff Wars in the Melitz Model
Felbermayr, Gabriel - 2011
This paper characterizes analytically the optimal tariff of a large one-sector economy with monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity in general equilibrium, thereby extending the small-country results of Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (JIE, 2009) and the homogeneous firms framework of Gros...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124179
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Existence and Warr Neutrality for Matching Equilibria in a Public Good Economy : An Aggregative Game Approach
Buchholz, Wolfgang - 2010
Using the aggregative game approach as developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007) this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria in which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013149366
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Temporary Migration Policies and Welfare of the Host and Source Countries : A Game-Theoretic Approach
Djajic, Slobodan - 2009
This paper examines the interaction between migration policies of the host and source countries in the context of a model of guest-worker migration. For the host, the objective is to provide low-cost labor for its employers while avoiding illegal immigration. It optimizes over these objectives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013155673
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Distributional Preferences in Probabilistic and Share Contests
Hoffmann, Magnus - 2013
We analyze Nash equilibria of share and probabilistic contests when players have distributional preferences. If players are sufficiently similar, distributional preferences create multiple equilibria. For the case of only mildly heterogeneous players, equilibrium effort can be lower as well as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083268
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Optimal Tariffs on Exhaustible Resources : The Case of a Quantity Setting Cartel
Fujiwara, Kenji - 2013
We formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the feedback Nash equilibrium and two Stackelberg equilibria under two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the strategic importing country, and leadership by the exporting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013091687
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Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Equilibrium Consumption Taxes in the Presence of Cross-Border Pollution
Michael, Michael S. - 2013
We consider a two small open economies model with cross-border pollution that is generated from consumption. Within this framework we examine i) the non-cooperative equilibrium consumption taxes and compare them to when pollution is only local, ii) the cooperative equilibrium consumption taxes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013072084
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Moral Hazard and Bargaining Over Incentive Contracts
Dittrich, Marcus - 2014
This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the … Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker …'s effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution depends on the agents. bargaining power. If agents have equal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048890