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Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations

Dur, Robert; Roelfsema, Hein - CESifo - 2007

We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate a manager’s attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when effort is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406384

Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives

Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri - CESifo - 2008

Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181606

Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers

Non, Arjan - CESifo - 2011

By incorporating reciprocity in an otherwise standard principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some, but not all, workers care more for their principal when they are convinced that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009274519

Leaders as Role Models for the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

Gaechter, Simon; Renner, Elke - CESifo - 2014

We investigate the link between leadership, beliefs and pro-social behavior. This link is interesting because field evidence suggests that people’s behavior in domains like charitable giving, tax evasion, corporate culture and corruption is influenced by leaders (CEOs, politicians) and beliefs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948862

Statistical Power of Within and Between-Subjects Designs in Economic Experiments

Bellemare, Charles; Bissonnette, Luc; Kröger, Sabine - CESifo - 2014

usefulness of the approach in the context of field experiments on gift exchange. Our results suggest that a BS design requires …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010960644

Directed Generosity and Network Formation: Network Dimension Matters

D'Exelle, Ben; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2010

We explore network effects on generosity for different network dimensions. To this end we elicit multiple network dimensions (friendship, social support, economic exchange, etc.) in a rural village in the Southern hemisphere and measure generosity with a sequence of dictator games conducted in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008833916

Did we Overestimate the Role of Social Preferences? The Case of Self-Selected Student Samples

Falk, Armin; Meier, Stephan; Zehnder, Christian - CESifo - 2010

phenomena. However, the empirical foundation of social preferences is largely based on laboratory experiments with self …-selected students as participants. This is potentially problematic as students participating in experiments may behave systematically … experiments with student samples misrepresent the importance of social preferences. Our first study shows that students who …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671736

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation

Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - CESifo - 2015

In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257671

Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation

Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - CESifo - 2014

The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010889984

Social Welfare versus Inequality Concerns in an Incomplete Contract Experiment

Faravelli, Marco; Kirchkamp, Oliver; Rainer, Helmut - CESifo - 2010

We study a situation where two players first choose a sharing rule, then invest into a joint production process, and then split joint benefits. We investigate how social preferences determine investments. In our experiment we find that even the materially disadvantaged player cares more for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008534038