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Hintermann, Beat; Rutherford, Thomas F. - CESifo - 2014

We develop a theory of social planning with a concern for economic coercion, which we define as the difference between consumers’ actual utility, and the “counterfactual” utility they expect to obtain if they were able to set policy themselves. Reasons to limit economic coercion include...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948852

Social Welfare and Coercion in Public Finance

Winer, Stanley L.; Tridimas, George; Hettich, Walter - CESifo - 2008

This paper develops an expanded framework for social planning in which the existence of coercion is explicitly acknowledged. Key issues concern the precise definition of coercion for individuals and in the aggregate, its difference from redistribution, and its incorporation into normative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181467

Partial Coercion, Conditional Cooperation, and Self-Commitment in Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods

Cettolin, Elena; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2011

finding is that in our setting conditional cooperation is not a strong enough force to increase contribution levels. Although …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278128

Withering Academia?

Frey, Bruno S. - CESifo - 2010

, increased division of labor in research, intense publication pressure, academic fraud, dilution of the concept of “university …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671696

What Drives Taxi Drivers? A Field Experiment on Fraud in a Market for Credence Goods

Balafoutas, Loukas; Beck, Adrian; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; … - CESifo - 2011

measure different types of fraud and to examine the influence of passengers’ presumed information and income on the extent of … fraud. Results reveal that taxi drivers cheat passengers in systematic ways: Passengers with inferior information about …. Higher income seems to lead to more fraud. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009020798

Lies in Disguise - A Theoretical Analysis of Cheating

Dufwenberg, Martin - 2017

We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, which we refer to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012965717

Laboratory Measure of Cheating Predicts Misbehavior at School

Cohn, Alain - 2017

Laboratory experiments provide insights into the drivers of cheating behaviour, but it is unclear to what extent cheating in the lab generalizes to the field. We conducted an experiment with middle and high school students to test whether a common laboratory measure of cheating predicts three...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970422

Disguising Lies - Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games

Khalmetski, Kiryl - 2019

We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)-type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902152

Withering Academia?

Frey, Bruno S. - 2010

, increased division of labor in research, intense publication pressure, academic fraud, dilution of the concept of “university …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013136878

An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamics of the Welfare State : The Case of Benefit Morale

Halla, Martin - 2009

assumptions and hypotheses. We study the dynamic effect of different welfare arrangements on benefit fraud. In particular, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013160043