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Compliance Dynamics Generated by Social Interaction Rules
Lipatov, Vilen - CESifo - 2014
We study compliance dynamics generated by a large set of behavioral rules describing social interaction in a population of agents facing an enforcement authority. When the authority adjusts the auditing probability every period, cycling in cheating-auditing occurs: Intensive monitoring induces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010764298
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Deterrence through Word of Mouth
Rincke, Johannes; Traxler, Christian - CESifo - 2009
The deterrent effect of law enforcement rests on the link between the actual and the perceived detection risk. We study the role of word of mouth for this linkage. Our approach makes use of micro data on compliance with TV license fees allowing us to distinguish between households who have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094256
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Whistle-Blower Protection : Theory and Experimental Evidence
Mechtenberg, Lydia - 2017
Whistle-blowing by employees plays a major role in uncovering corporate fraud. Various recent laws aim at improving protection of whistle-blowers and enhancing their willingness to report. Evidence on the effectiveness of such legislation is, however, scarce. Moreover, critics have raised...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012958733
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Compliance Dynamics Generated by Social Interaction Rules
Lipatov, Vilen - 2021
We study compliance dynamics generated by a large set of behavioral rules describing social interaction in a population of agents facing an enforcement authority. When the authority adjusts the auditing probability every period, cycling in cheating-auditing occurs: Intensive monitoring induces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315606
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Deterrence through Word of Mouth
Rincke, Johannes; Traxler, Christian - 2021
The deterrent effect of law enforcement rests on the link between the actual and the perceived detection risk. We study the role of word of mouth for this linkage. Our approach makes use of micro data on compliance with TV license fees allowing us to distinguish between households who have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316402
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Deception Under Time Pressure : Conscious Decision or a Problem of Awareness?
Konrad, Kai A. - 2017
Time is a crucial determinant of deception, since some misreporting opportunities come as a surprise and require an intuitive decision while others allow for extensive reflection time. To be able to pursue a deceptive strategy, however, a subject must be aware of the misreporting opportunity....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012945055
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Reason, Intuition, and Time
Sahm, Marco; Weizsäcker, Robert K. von - CESifo - 2014
prevalent in early and late stages of a learning process, whereas reason governs decisions in intermediate stages. Examples …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103391
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On the Perils of Stabilizing Prices when Agents are Learning
Mele, Antonio; Molnár, Krisztina; Santoro, Sergio - CESifo - 2015
losses are outweighed by short term gains from the learning phase. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011155373
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Policy Experimentation, Political Competition, and Heterogeneous Beliefs
Millner, Antony; Ollivier, Hélène; Simon, Leo - CESifo - 2014
endogenously influence whether learning occurs through its policy choices (policy experimentation), future political competition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781549
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Optimal Monetary Policy when Agents are Learning
Molnár, Krisztina; Santoro, Sergio - CESifo - 2010
We derive the optimal monetary policy in a sticky price model when private agents follow adaptive learning. We show … order to facilitate private sector learning and thus ease the future intratemporal inflation-output gap trade-offs. The … policy recommendation is robust: the welfare loss entailed by the optimal policy under learning if the private sector …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596587