We develop a model of vertical innovation in which firms incur a market entry cost and choose a unique level of quality … spectrum has top and a bottom, is thus overcome by sequential entry. Our main contribution lies in handling these asymmetries …

We consider the effects of taxes for competing two-sided platforms. We first detail how a platform passes a tax …

We consider the effects of taxes for competing two-sided platforms. We first detail how a platform passes a tax …

, the licensee's entry into the final products market, although increases the competition and the cost that the licensor … faces, it reinforces, instead of weakens, the licensing incentives. Furthermore, the licensee's entry augments the positive …

oligopoly. We find that in the short run, i.e. when the number of firms in both markets is exogenous, the results concerning tax … under-shifting are more pronounced, potentially to a very large extent. Instead, in the long run under endogenous entry and … exit over-shifting of both taxes is more likely to occur and is more pronounced under upstream oligopoly. As a result of …

that the monopoly platform does not introduce distortions over and above those arising from the market power of the …