We develop a simple model of banking regulation with two policy instruments: minimum capital requirements and … regulation. Therefore, countries are better off by harmonising regulation on an international standard …

We develop a simple model of banking regulation with two policy instruments: minimum capital requirements and … regulation. Therefore, countries are better off by harmonising regulation on an international standard. …

The paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk. Regulatory risk is captured by … funds. Results are as follows: 1) The regulator's reaction to regulatory risk depends on the curvature of aggregate demand …. 2) It yields a positive information rent effect exactly when demand is convex. 3) Firms benefit from regulatory risk …

We develop a model to discuss a government's incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The …-based regulation policy requires the government to make use of a bureaucracy; this has a bureaucratic cost, as the bureaucracy diverts … implications for when and how a government should delegate its regulation of industry. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces …

and labour market regulation on the capital stock. Several alternative testing methods show that the negative influence of … product and labour market regulation is considerably stronger at higher levels. The paper uncovers important policy …

consumption options and show how optimal regulation evolves over time. In our base setting where social and private learning …

Strategic delegation to an independent regulator with a pure consumer standard improves dynamic regulation by …

, we contrast producer liability and minimum quality standard regulation as alternative means of social control of product …-related torts when consumers are heterogeneously overconfident about the risk of harm. We elucidate the role of factors shaping the … relative desirability of strict liability vis-à-vis minimum quality standard regulation from a social welfare standpoint. We …

We consider the regulation of national firms in a common market. Regulators can influence the production of national … cost correlation and ex-ante technological risk. Finally, we characterize the global optimum and show how it can be …