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Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Daniel J.; Vries, Casper G. de - 2021

The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with complete and incomplete...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316185

Self-Allocation in Contests

Bernergard, Axel - 2017

We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947451

Disguising Lies - Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games

Khalmetski, Kiryl - 2019

We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)-type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902152

Competing with Asking Prices

Lester, Benjamin - 2016

In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986936

Long Persuasion Games

Koessler, Frédéric - 2007

This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778541

Volunteering and the Strategic Value of Ignorance

Morath, Florian - 2021

Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316020

'Buy-it-Now' or 'Sell-it-Now' Auctions : Effects of Changing Bargaining Power in Sequential Trading Mechanisms

Grebe, Tim - 2016

We study experimentally the effect of bargaining power in two sequential mechanisms that offer the possibility to trade at a fixed price before an auction. In the “Buy-It-Now” format, the seller has the bargaining power and offers a price prior to the auction; whereas in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000430

The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms

Di Tillio, Alfredo - 2014

This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047263

Adaptive Social Learning

March, Christoph - 2016

The paper investigates social-learning when the information structure is not commonly known. Individuals repeatedly … interact in social-learning settings with distinct information structures. In each round of interaction, they use their … behavior in the long-run if and only if individuals distinguish social-learning settings and receive rich feedback after each …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012996206

The Scope of Auctions in the Presence of Downstream Interactions and Information Externalities

Koska, Onur A. - 2015

We scrutinize the scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities by using the topical example of a firm acquisition. We show that no mechanism exists that allows an investor to acquire a low-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013024732