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Merchant guilds have been portrayed as social networks that generated beneficial social capital by sustaining shared norms, effectively transmitting information, and successfully undertaking collective action. This social capital, it is claimed, benefited society as a whole by enabling rulers to...
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We study the feasibility and profitability of predation in a dynamic environment, using a parsimonious infinite-horizon, complete information setting in which an incumbent repeatedly faces potential entry. When a rival enters, the incumbent chooses whether to accommodate or predate it; the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014556715
We study the propensity of independent algorithms to collude in repeated Cournot duopoly games. Specifically, we investigate the predictive power of different oligopoly and bargaining solutions regarding the effect of asymmetry between firms. We find that both consumers and firms can benefit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015186355
Competition authorities increasingly rely on economic screening tools to identify markets where firms deviate from competitive norms. Traditional screening methods assume that collusion occurs through secret agreements. However, recent research highlights that firms can use public announcements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015434412
We develop a tractable model of competitive price cycles where prices are chosen alternatingly and consumers have heterogenous information. The model yields sharp empirical predictions about price patterns, impact of captive consumers and pass-through. Using rich station-level price data from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015426834
This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850139
The paper undertakes a cross-sectoral analysis of a salient empirical implication of the model of tacit collusion advanced by Abreu et al (1986). Specifically, the prevalence of a first order Markovian process for alternating between price wars and collusive periods is assessed by means of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009355122