This paper gives an account of events, and explains some systematic reasons of the UMTS auction flop in Switzerland … to import some keyingredients of the auction design employed in Germany and Austria. This would have assured higher …

The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more … competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and … presents a game theoretic explanation of observed events during the crucial phase of that auction, which have puzzled several …

This paper considers bidder behaviour in the United Kingdom s UMTS spectrum auction. Evidence is reviewed which shows … that some bidders in this auction did not bid straightforwardly in accordance with fixed valuations of the licenses. We go … strong direct evidence. We conclude that the rationalization of bidding in the United Kingdom s UMTS auction remains …

German (and Austrian) UMTS auction. In particular, we discuss in detail the exposure problem that caused firms in Germany to …

In this paper I review the Dutch UMTS-auction that took place in the summer of 2000 and which, in contrast to the UK … and German auctions, was generally considered to be a major flop. I analyse the policy process leading to the auction as … well as the bidding behaviour in the auction, and provide an evaluation of both. I demonstrate that the case contains …

Recently, the combinatorial clock auction has become more and more common in the auctioning of telecommunication … licenses. Although the auction design is complex, the promise is that bidding becomes simple - truthtelling is "close to … optimal". We show that this claim is too strong. The auction entails several strategic complexities which make bidding non …

The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in … a simultaneous ascending-bid auction.The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and …

auction is the better selling mechanism. However, why exactly an auction should be preferred is unclear. Here we present an …

-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to … allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and … alleviates adverse selection. It can earn the investor a higher expected payoff than a separating auction, even when consistency …

a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi …-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price. …