After the financial crisis of 2008, central banks around the world have increased their communication efforts to reach consumers, with the aim of both guiding and anchoring their inflation expectations. For the expectations channel of monetary policy to work as intended, central banks need a...

In this paper, we explore the degree of anchoring of consumers' individual long-run inflation expectations utilizing the University of Michigan Survey of Consumer's rotating panel micro-structure. Our results indicate that long-run inflation expectations became more anchored over the last...

We study the effects of forward-looking communication in an environment of rising inflation rates on German consumers' inflation expectations using a randomized control trial. We show that information about rising inflation increases short- and long-term inflation expectations. This initial...

Using a new consumer survey dataset, we show that macroeconomic preferences affect expectations and economic decisions through different channels. While household expectations are on average inversely related to preferences, households with the same inflation or interest rate expectations can...

Bailouts sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are famous for their conditionality: in return for continued installments of desperately needed loans, governments must comply with austere policy changes. Many have suggested, however, that politically important countries face rather...

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks - election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans....

As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that...

We show how major shareholders can exploit their power over international organizations to hide their foreign-policy interventions from domestic audiences. We argue that major powers exert influence bilaterally when domestic audiences view the intervention favorably. When domestic audiences are...