We investigate the effect of a vertical merger on downstream firms' ability to collude in a repeated game framework. We show that a vertical merger has two main effects. On the one hand, it increases the total collusive profits, increasing the stakes of collusion. On the other hand, it creates...

Platforms often use fee discrimination within their marketplace (e.g., Amazon, eBay, and Uber specify a variety of merchant fees). To better understand the impact of marketplace fee discrimination, we develop a model that allows us to determine equilibrium fee and category decisions that depend...

We study information design in a vertically differentiated market. Two firms offer products of ex-ante unknown qualities. A third party designs a system to publicly disclose information. More precise information guides consumers toward their preferred product but increases expected product...

"Double marginalization" and "Elimination of Double marginalization" are catch-phrases commonly used in the IO literature. In this note, I trace back the origin of the idea to Chapter IX, on complementary goods monopolies, of Cournot (1838). Through the years Cournot's contribution remained a...

In a recent paper, Alipranti et al. (2014, Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market, Economics Letters, 124: 122-126) show that in a vertically related market Cournot competition yields higher social welfare compared to Bertrand competition if the upstream firm subsidises...

We study upstream horizontal mergers and their potential efficiency gains. We show that an upstream horizontal merger can give rise to two efficiency-enhancing effects when firms trade through two-part tariffs. It increases R&D investments and decreases wholesale prices when downstream...