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We construct game theoretic foundations for bargaining in the shadow of a trial. Plaintiff and defendant both have noisy signals of a common-value trial judgment and make simultaneous offers to settle. If the offers cross, they settle on the average offer; otherwise, both litigants incur an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509331
; signaling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003720823
In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers …' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information … workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011888619
up. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is costly but can indicate strong love. The striking property … sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer couples get married remains …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011752304
portfolios to investors. We extend the signaling model for single sales of risky assets to portfolio sales. We identify … conditions under which signaling at the portfolio level dominates signaling at the single asset level. In particular, when banks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011610925
strategically distorted information. This ambiguity about the type of spy gives rise to a non-standard signaling problem where both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333
We analyze optimal redistribution in the presence of labor market signaling where innate productive ability is not only … unobserved by the government, but also by prospective employers. Signaling in both one and two dimensions is considered, where in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012599061
This paper considers competitive search equilibrium in a market for a good whose quality differs across sellers. Each seller knows the quality of the good that he or she is offering for sale, but buyers cannot observe quality directly. We thus have a “market for lemons” with competitive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015052556
What is an effective signal in crowd funding? We asked this question to 83 expert researchers who have published the top-notch articles in this field. They stated that, in theory, strong signals include past crowdfunding success, business experience, patent ownership, and the equity share...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015125554
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937803