We explore effects of simultaneous price changes for the demand of a group of goods, which we refer to as a compound commodity. Specifically, we consider unit and proportional cost components (e. g., taxes, transportation costs, etc.) imposed on the compound commodity. We find that there is a...

We consider a government facing a constraint on the total consumption of a specific good with varieties, and formulate an optimal commodity tax problem under a consumption target. We obtain a uniform pricing result (similar to the familiar uniform taxation rule): setting the same consumer price...

We consider an optimal commodity taxation problem under a consumption target and prove the existence of an optimal solution for the problem. This optimal solution obeys taxation rules that are contrary to standard taxation rules such as the inverse-elasticity rule. We also verify the necessary...

In this paper we investigate trade union formation. To this end we apply a model with two types of labour where the interests of both groups of labourers are represented by either a joint (industry) labour union or by two independent group-specific (professional) labour unions. We investigate...

In the present paper we extend the classical tax-competition framework of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) by modelling involuntary unemployment and by allowing for labour taxation as a second source of public funds. For a large class of production functions (including CES), it turns out that tax...

Ogawa et al. (2006) analyze capital tax competition in a fixed-wage approach and show that the original results of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) are not preserved in the presence of unemployment. In the present paper we challenge this view and investigate capital tax competition for some...

This paper contributes to the analysis of central vs. decentral (firm-level) labour market negotiations. We argue that during negotiations on a central scale employers and employees plausibly take output market effects into account, while they behave competitively during firm-level negotiations....

In this paper we investigate optimal harvesting of a renewable natural resource. While in the standard approach the resource is located at a single point in space we allow for the resource to be distributed over the plane. Consequently, an agent who exploits the resource has to travel from one...

We interpret the TV-show Come Dine with Me as a simultaneous non-cooperative game with evaluation levels as strategic variables, and show that it belongs to a class of strategic games which we label mutual evaluations games (MEG). Any MEG possesses a "zero equilibrium" - i. e. a Nash equilibrium...