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Until taxes do us part : tax penalties or bonuses and the marriage decision

Barigozzi, Francesca; Cremer, Helmuth; Roeder, Kerstin - 2017

The tax regimes applied to couples in many countries including the US, France, and Germany imply either a marriage … penalty or a marriage bonus. We study how they affect the decision to get married by considering two potential spouses who … play a marriage proposal game. At the end of the game they may get married, live together without formal marriage, or split …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011752304

Optimal income taxation with tax competition

Lipatov, Vilen; Weichenrieder, Alfons J. - 2010

We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels. We analyze a symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003982002

Optimal tariffs, retaliation and the welfare loss from tariff wars in the Melitz model

Felbermayr, Gabriel; Jung, Benjamin; Larch, Mario - 2011

This paper characterizes analytically the optimal tariff of a large one-sector economy with monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity in general equilibrium, thereby extending the small-country results of Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (JIE, 2009) and the homogeneous firms framework of Gros...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009130204

The strategic value of carbon tariffs

Böhringer, Christoph; Carbone, Jared C.; Rutherford, … - 2013 - This version: October 2013

Unilateral carbon policies are inefficient due to the fact that they generally involve emission reductions in countries with high marginal abatement costs and because they are subject to carbon leakage. In this paper, we ask whether the use of carbon tariffs - tariffs on the carbon embodied in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211482

Distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests

Hoffmann, Magnus; Kolmar, Martin - 2013

We analyze Nash equilibria of share and probabilistic contests when players have distributional preferences. If players are sufficiently similar, distributional preferences create multiple equilibria. For the case of only mildly heterogeneous players, equilibrium effort can be lower as well as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009727108

Self-enforcing international environmental agreements and trade : taxes versus caps

Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger - 2014

This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010404554

Implementing partial tax harmonization in an asymmetric tax competition game with repeated interaction

Itaya, Jun-ichi; Okamura, Makoto; Yamaguchi, Chikara - 2015

This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three countries with heterogenous capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e. full...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010509603

Trade retaliation in a monetary-trade model

Whalley, John; Yu, Jun; Zhang, Shunming - 2009

We explore how outcomes of trade policy retaliation (Nash tariff games) are affected when trade simultaneously takes places geographically across countries and through time via financial intermediation. In such models deficits and surpluses in goods trade are endogenously determined, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003806727

Temporary migration policies and welfare of the host and source countries : a game-theoretic approach

Djajić, Slobodan; Michael, Michael S. - 2009

This paper examines the interaction between migration policies of the host and source countries in the context of a model of guest-worker migration. For the host, the objective is to provide low-cost labor for its employers while avoiding illegal immigration. It optimizes over these objectives...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003888074

Entry regulation and the influence of an incumbent special interest group

Evans, John Bussell; Fingleton, John - 2002

The literature on both entry deterrence and the influence of special interest groups is extensive. In this paper we attempt to marry these strands of literature by developing a model of entry deterrence through interest group influence in an entry re-regulation context. In contrast to other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539115