point out that the first best can be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium when the players are sufficiently patient …, we derive the second best equilibrium when they are not. This equilibrium is distorted in that countries over-invest in …

in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. If the agent's type is his private information, Pareto frontier of mechanisms' payoffs … optimal price is the optimal mechanism. The complete information case is a strong form of folk theorem while the incomplete … information case shows that folk theorem breaks down with private information even as the discount factor goes to one. Results …

strategically distorted information. This ambiguity about the type of spy gives rise to a non-standard signaling problem where both … sender and receiver of messages have private information and the sender has a chance to make an unobserved move. Whereas … equilibria and is strongest in the unique pooling equilibrium which is also the payoff dominant equilibrium. …

. In a class of public good games, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted game can be empty, while limit … (perfect Bayesian) Nash equilibrium payoffs of the discounted game, as players become infinitely patient, do exist. These …

When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, and thus non-verifiable by a third party, the … information in order to collect a monetary penalty from him. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources … efficient outcome is feasible by exploiting the timing of private information. If the private information arrives before the …

. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for … the two-player case with complete and incomplete information, and in so doing identify what we call the "Herodotus Paradox". …

conjectures. We show that a unique equilibrium may be selected by conveniently perturbing the information structure. Both under … complete and asymmetric information, we show that the equilibrium outputs of the intrinsic common agency game are also …This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct exter-nalities between …

benefits only if they aggregate their private information. Some members of the society, however, are harmed by socially … desirable policies and aim at manipulating information aggregation by misrepresenting their private information. We show that … information can be aggregated and a socially desirable policy can be implemented under a new class of democratic mechanisms …

the financial consequences of actions, induced by incomplete information about the costs of providing quality, affect … relational contracts in buyer-seller relationships. Under incomplete information, payoffs to actions become private information … relationships, even if credibility is held constant. Comparing seller-buyer relationships with and without complete information …