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We study the relative performance of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction and the second-price sealed‐bid auction in a … reveals the winner’s payment to an outside observer. We find that the first‐price sealed‐bid auction in which the winner …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011906329
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011488000
overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay and the first-price winner-pay auction. Both risk and …. Indeed, we find that spite is a more convincing explanation for bidding behavior for the second-price all-pay auction. Not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012002983
. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012668312
(ERA) is a first-price auction in which truthful bidding is encouraged by bonus payments. We test the robustness property …An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010347030
-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to … allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and … alleviates adverse selection. It can earn the investor a higher expected payoff than a separating auction, even when consistency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496103
a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi …-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011447525
Bubbles are omnipresent in lab experiments with asset markets. Most of these experiments were conducted in environments … effect of algorithmic traders we use a design where we manipulate only the expectations of human traders. We find clearly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011392621
The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history …. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003994504
We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and innate abilities generate inventions of varying qualities. The designer offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality and receives the revenue generated by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260048