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Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations

Lang, Matthias - 2021

Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from traditional moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties, which real-world contracts rarely use. I show that the implicit assumption of deterministic contracts makes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012697032

Overwhelmed by routine tasks : a multi-tasking principal agent perspective

Demougin, Dominique; Helm, Carsten - 2022

We analyze a multitasking model with a verifiable routine task and a skill-dependent activity characterized by moral hazard. Contracts negotiated by firm/employee pairs follow from Nash bargaining. High- and low-skilled employees specialize, intermediate productivity employees perform both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013201713

Procedural vs. substantive approaches in non-comprehensive contracts

Demougin, Dominique; Bental, Benjamin - 2025

preponderance-of-the-evidence to determine whether the agent acted in accordance with the contract. In the second method, the court … adopts a substantive approach, treating the original contract as incomplete, thus rendering a decision based on what it … believes the parties would have agreed upon had they been able to complete the contract ahead of time. From an efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015396893

Optimal contracting with endogenous project mission

Cassar, Lea - 2016

I analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent and can influence the agent’s marginal return of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011561184

Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers

Non, Arjan - 2011

. Furthermore, since some workers do not reciprocate the principal's altruism, the principal may find it optimal to write a contract … that simultaneously signals his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types. Such a contract is characterised by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009261791

Observable strategies, commitments, and contracts

Wärneryd, Karl Erik - 2014

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437999

Optimal contracts for discouraging deforestation with risk averse agents

Mason, Charles F. - 2018

There is an emerging consensus that carbon emissions must be limited. An attractive approach to promoting carbon reductions is to encourage reductions in deforestation. But any such strategy must confront a basic problem: agents that might be induced to reduce their actions which would reduce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855609

All hat and no cattle? : ESG incentives in executive compensation

Efing, Matthias; Ehmann, Stefanie; Kampkötter, Patrick; … - 2024

This paper examines the integration of ESG performance metrics into executive compensation using a detailed panel dataset of European executives. Despite becoming more widespread, most ESG metrics are largely discretionary, carry immaterial weights in payout calculations, and contribute little...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015077841

Fairness properties of compensation schemes

Becker, Christoph; Fehr, Dietmar; Rau, Hannes; … - 2025

How do different characteristics of pay-for-performance schemes affect fairness perceptions? In two studies, we systematically consider three major classes of incentive schemes: continuous piece rate incentives, discrete bonus schemes, and tournament incentives. We find that pay inequality has a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015414143

Self-confidence and reactions to subjective performance evaluations

Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander - 2018

Subjective performance evaluations are commonly used to provide feedback and incentives to workers. However, such evaluations can generate significant disagreements and conflicts, the severity of which may be driven by many factors. In this paper we show that a workers' level of self-confidence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011927889