Modern life offers nearly unbridled access to information; it is the harnessing of this information to guide decision-making that presents a challenge. We study how one individual may try to shape the way another person interprets objective information by proposing a causal explanation (or...

Overall, 72 subjects invest their endowment in four risky assets. Each com-bination of assets yields the same expected return and variance of returns. Illusion of expertise prevails when one prefers nevertheless the self-selected portfolio. After being randomly assigned to groups of four...

We study the effect of analyst coverage on firms' innovation strategy and outcome. By considering three different channels that allow firms to innovate: internal R&D, acquisitions of other innovative firms, and investments in corporate venture capital (CVC), we are able to distinguish between...

In this chapter, we first discuss the limitations of traditional financial advice, which led to the emergence of robo-advising. We then describe the main features of robo-advising and propose a taxonomy of robo-advisors based on four defining dimensions - personalization, discretion,...

We show that the recently released text-based artificial intelligence tool GPT-4 can provide suitable financial advice. The tool suggests specific investment portfolios that reflect an investor's individual circumstances such as risk tolerance, risk capacity, and sustainability preference....

We study whether large language models (LLMs) can generate suitable financial advice and which LLM features are associated with higher-quality advice. To this end, we elicit portfolio recommendations from 32 LLMs for 64 investor profiles, which differ in their risk preferences, home country,...

In our model, an agent produces an outcome by a costly effort and then distributes it among heterogeneous users. The agents̕ payoff is the weighted sum of the users ̕shares and the coefficient reflecting their heterogeneity. When the agent neglects users ̕heterogeneity the game leads to an...

Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cash flow of the firms they manage. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence gives them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their firms. We study the agency problem between...

Corporate scandals, reflected in excessive management compensation and fraudulent accounts, cause considerable damage. Agency theory’s insistence on linking the compensation of managers and directors as closely as possible to firm performance is a major reason for these scandals. They cannot...

We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of...