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Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic … effect which reduces an inefficient agent's take-the-money-and-run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control …, it is optimal when uncertainty about operational efficiency is large. Moreover, delegation is more effective with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010347364
of risk aversion, the higher the agency costs for delegation and hence the less profitable is a flexible contract versus … have sharp heterogeneous beliefs. -- delegation ; flexibility ; agency costs ; multiple priors ; imprecision aversion … rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by the agent, but also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003936681
principal may delegate additional authority in order to screen for managers of high ability. -- agency problems ; delegation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003942661
relates to the candidates type . Delegation is then superior to direct (owner) recruitment and offering tenure or guaranteed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514022
Using field and laboratory experiments, we demonstrate that the complexity of incentive schemes and worker bounded rationality can affect effort provision, by shrouding attributes of the incentives. In our setting, complexity leads workers to over-provide effort relative to a fully rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014309731
We analyze a repeated principal-agent setting in which the principal cares about the agent's verifiable effort as well as an extra profit that can be generated only if the agent is talented. The agent is overconfident about his talent and updates beliefs using Bayes' rule. An exploitation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014292070
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437999
This paper explores how a relational contract establishes a norm of reciprocity and how such a norm shapes the provision of informal incentives. Developing a model of a long-term employment relationship, I show that generous upfront wages that activate the norm of reciprocity are more important...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012002999
We explore how inherent preferences for reciprocity and repeated interaction interact in an optimal incentive system. Developing a theoretical model of a long-term employment relationship, we first show that reciprocal preferences are more important when an employee is close to retirement. At...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011718616
Companies typically control various aspects of their workers' behaviors. In this paper, we investigate whether the hierarchical distance of the superior who imposes such control measures matters for the workers' ensuing reaction. In particular, we test, in a laboratory experiment, whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013255629