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Bank competition and financial stability : a general equilibrium exposition

De Nicolò, Gianni; Lucchetta, Marcella - 2013 - This draft: January 30, 2013

mechanisms for bank risk-taking studied in a large partial equilibrium literature. We show that competitive equilibriums maximize … banks is higher than that of banks enjoying monopoly rents, and is robust to the introduction of social costs of bank … failures. In this model, there is no trade-off between bank competition and financial stability. -- general equilibrium ; bank …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009707593

A novel framework to evaluate changes in access to and costs of trade finance

Auboin, Marc; Bekkers, Eddy; De Quarti, Dario - 2023

through a comprehensive bank survey in these countries complemented with data from the literature. Counterfactual experiments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014284646

Ethnic fractionalization, governance and loan defaults in Africa

Andrianova, Svetlana; Baltagi, Badi H.; Demetriades, … - 2014

We present a theoretical model of moral hazard and adverse selection in an imperfectly competitive loans market that is suitable for application to Africa. The model allows for variation in both the level of contract enforcement (depending on the quality of governance) and the degree of market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010424751

Market transparency, adverse selection, and moral hazard

Klein, Tobias J.; Lambertz, Christian; Stahl, Konrad - 2013

We study the effects of improvements in market transparency on eBay on seller exit and continuing sellers' behavior. An improvement in market transparency by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings led to a significant increase in buyer valuation especially of sellers rated poorly prior to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227243

Second-degree moral hazard in a real-world credence goods market

Balafoutas, Loukas; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2013 - This version: 16 October 2013

Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard – the tendency of the supply...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199693

How to share it out : the value of information in teams

Gershkov, Alex; Li, Jianpei; Schweinzer, Paul - 2014

We study the role of information exchange, leadership and coordination in team or partnership structures. For this purpose, we view individuals jointly engaging in productive processes-a "team"-as endowed with individual and privately held information on the joint production process. Once...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010405163

Secrecy jurisdictions

Schjelderup, Guttorm - 2015

This paper surveys tax haven legislation and links the literature on tax havens to the literature on asymmetric information. I argue that the core aim of tax haven legislation is to create private information (secrecy) for the users of tax havens. This leads to moral hazard and transaction costs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491735

Universal basic income versus unemployment insurance

Fabre, Alice; Pallage, Stéphane J.; Zimmermann, Christian - 2014

In this paper we compare the welfare effects of unemployment insurance (UI) with an universal basic income (UBI) system in an economy with idiosyncratic shocks to employment. Both policies provide a safety net in the face of idiosyncratic shocks. While the unemployment insurance program should...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010459671

Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants

Hili, Amal; Laussel, Didier; Long, Ngo Van - 2016

We analyze the optimal contract between a risk-averse manager and the initial shareholders in a two-period model where the manager's investment effort, carried out in period 1, and her current effort, carried out in period 2, both impact the second-period profit, so that it may be difficult to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538964

Moral hazard : base models and two extensions

Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, J. David - 2016

We analyze the optimal contract in static moral hazard situations, where the agent’s effort is not verifiable. We first present the main trade-offs of the principal-agent model. We cover the trade-off of incentives (motivation) vs. risk-sharing (efficiency), incentives vs. rents (when the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451122