Showing 1 - 10 of 1,158
We study the optimal duration of contracts in a principal-agent framework with both moral hazard and adverse selection …. Agents decide on a contract-specific and non-verifiable investment. Incentive compatibility requires that initial contracts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011780588
In public procur ement a temporal separation between award and actual contract allows private entrepreneurs who did not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781703
We study how informal buyer-supplier relationships in the German automotive industry affect procurement. Using unique data from a survey focusing on these, we show that more trust, the belief that the trading partner acts to maintain the mutual relationship, is associated with both higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012649766
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437999
This paper explores how a relational contract establishes a norm of reciprocity and how such a norm shapes the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012002999
Economic and social situations where groups have to compete are ubiquitous. Such group contests create both a coordination problem within and between groups. Introducing leaders may help to mitigate these coordination problems. However, little is known about the effect of leadership in group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015191764
We examine the effect of the interaction between resource rents and democracy on corruption for a panel of 29 Sub-Saharan countries during the period from 1985 to 2007. We find that higher resource rents lead to more corruption and that the effect is significantly stronger in less democratic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009301201
This paper evaluates direct and structural discrimination as a means of increasing efforts in the most widely studied contests. We establish that a designer who maximizes efforts subject to a balanced-budget constraint prefers dual discrimination, namely, change of the contestants ́prize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010223058
We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467392
This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003854423