We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the … contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one … where no contestant would wish to change his choice of contest, results in the allocation of players to contests that …

I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize … contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r ≥ 2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or … the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r …

We model the dynamic contest between two players as a game of tug-of-war with a Tullock contest success function (CSF …

A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of … contestants because of the "discouragement effect." Leveling the playing field by favoring weaker contestants through bid-caps and … favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the discouragement effect and increase the designer's revenue. We test these predictions …

first-best revenue. In the lottery contest, head starts are less effective than biases and combining both instruments cannot … unambiguous revenue-ranking of all six combinations of contest formats and instruments. …

-terms) the player acting in the final two matches. The reason is the substantially weaker than predicted discouragement of this …

antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the bureaucrats. This paper characterizes the Nash equilibria in lobbying and …