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The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities

Koska, Onur A.; Onur, Ilke; Stähler, Frank - 2015

We scrutinize the scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities by using …-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to … allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496103

Implementing efficient market structure

Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clark-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781544

Optimal cost overruns : procurement auctions and renegotiation

Herweg, Fabian; Schwarz, Marco A. - 2016 - This version: March 18, 2016

a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi …-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011447525

Spite vs. risk : explaining overbidding

Kirchkamp, Oliver; Mill, Wladislaw - 2019

overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay and the first-price winner-pay auction. Both risk and …. Indeed, we find that spite is a more convincing explanation for bidding behavior for the second-price all-pay auction. Not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012002983

Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? : an experimental investigation

Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; … - 2018

This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822038

How to sell a (bankrupt) company

Cornelli, Francesca; Felli, Leonardo - 2000

The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails the sale of such company. This paper suggests a way to sell the company that maximizes the creditors' proceeds. The key to this proposal is the option left to the creditors to retain a fraction of the shares of the company. Indeed, by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781568

Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions

Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kocher, Martin; … - 2021

. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012668312

Foreign bidders going once, going twice... : protection in government procurement auctions

Cole, Matthew T.; Davies, Ronald B. - 2014

Until recently, government procurement bidding processes have generally favored domestic firms by awarding the contract to a domestic firm even if a foreign firm tenders a lower bid, so long as the difference between the two is sufficiently small. This has been replaced by an agreement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256100

Innovation contests

Pérez-Castrillo, J. David; Wettstein, David - 2014

We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and innate abilities generate inventions of varying qualities. The designer offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality and receives the revenue generated by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260048

Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may serve as a signal

Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2014

If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010231626