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Epstein, Gil S.; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 2002

clarify how stake asymmetry, lobbying-skill asymmetry and return to lobbying effort determine the relative desirability, from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011513996

Let's (not) escalate this! : leadership and communication in a group contest

Heine, Florian; Riedl, Arno - 2025

Economic and social situations where groups have to compete are ubiquitous. Such group contests create both a coordination problem within and between groups. Introducing leaders may help to mitigate these coordination problems. However, little is known about the effect of leadership in group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015191764

Group contests with internal conflict and power asymmetry

Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - 2014

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467392

Direct and structural discrimination in contests

Mealem, Yosef; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 2013

This paper evaluates direct and structural discrimination as a means of increasing efforts in the most widely studied contests. We establish that a designer who maximizes efforts subject to a balanced-budget constraint prefers dual discrimination, namely, change of the contestants ́prize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010223058

Self-allocation in contests

Bernergård, Axel; Wärneryd, Karl Erik - 2017

We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011718621

Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes

Laica, Christoph; Lauber, Arne; Sahm, Marco - 2017 - This version: October 6, 2017

We examine the fairness and intensity of sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes. With three symmetric players and two prizes, the tournament is completely fair if and only if the second prize is valued half of the first prize, regardless of whether matches are organized as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011735948

Are sequential round-robin tournaments discriminatory?

Sahm, Marco - 2017

I examine sequential round-robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players. Each player is matched once with each other player. If the matches are organized as Tullock contests (all-pay auctions), the tournament will be almost fair (highly discriminatory): subject to the position of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011638282

Contests among bureaucrats

Bös, Dieter - 2002

This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total … departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The … antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the bureaucrats. This paper characterizes the Nash equilibria in lobbying and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514012

Optimal accuracy of unbiased tullock contests with two heterogeneous players

Sahm, Marco - 2022

I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012886568

Tullock brings perseverance and suspense to tug-of-war

Karagözoğlu, Emin; Sağlam, Hüseyin Çağri; Turan, … - 2020

We model the dynamic contest between two players as a game of tug-of-war with a Tullock contest success function (CSF). We show that (pure strategy) Markov perfect equilibrium of this game exists, and it is unique. In this equilibrium - in stark contrast to a model of tug-of-war with an all pay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012165990