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Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justification, her message space is restricted, but the message is costless. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361447
I analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent and can influence the agent’s marginal return of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011561184
preponderance-of-the-evidence to determine whether the agent acted in accordance with the contract. In the second method, the court … adopts a substantive approach, treating the original contract as incomplete, thus rendering a decision based on what it … believes the parties would have agreed upon had they been able to complete the contract ahead of time. From an efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015396893
derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011926023
In the context of common agency adverse-selection games weillustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to studyequilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate thatan extension of the taxation principle what we term the delegation principle can be used to characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400675
This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately-observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011300994
This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the … bargaining power, the contract in the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution yields a more efficient outcome and induces more effort. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010388771
that hardly explains the many features of an insurance contract. We extend this setup to include the situation that the … costlessly observable, then it should be included in the contract to improve the risk sharing-incentive trade-off under moral … resulting incompleteness of the contract opens the door to controversies and disputes that may lead to judicial procedures. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011723471
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437999
We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010212358