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Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk : the two-player case

Vida, Péter; Forges, Françoise - 2011

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be …. -- Bayesian game ; cheap talk ; communication equilibrium ; correlated equilibrium ; pre-play communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009010498

Long persuasion games

Forges, Françoise (contributor); … - 2006

This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003301085

Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages : experimental evidence on forward induction

Blume, Andreas; Kriss, Peter H.; Weber, Roberto A. - 2016

We experimentally study optional costly communication in Stag-Hunt games. Prior research demonstrates that efficient … coordination is difficult without a communication option but obtains regularly with mandatory costless pre-play messages. We find … that even small communication costs dramatically reduce message use when communication is optional, but efficient …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011492032

Transparency is overrated : communicating in a coordination game with private information

Cabrales, Antonio; Drouvelis, Michalis; Gurguc, Zeynep; … - 2017

We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, allowing a possible round of either one-way or two-way cheap talk before the game is played. We compare different treatments to study truthful revelation of information and subsequent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011761639

Disguising lies : image concerns and partial lying in cheating games

Khalmetski, Kiryl; Sliwka, Dirk - 2017

We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603130

The value of non-binding announcements in public goods experiments : some theory and experimental evidence

Berlemann, Michael (contributor); … - 2004

In this paper we present three simple theoretical models to explain the influence of the possibility to make non-binding announcements on investment behaviour in public goods settings. Our models build on the idea that voluntary contributions to the supply of a public good might be motivated by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002521709

Noncooperative support of public norm enforcement in large societies

Falkinger, Josef (contributor) - 2004

In small groups norm enforcement is provided by mutual punishment and reward. In large societies we have enforcement institutions. This paper shows how such institutions can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium. In a first stage, individuals invest in a public enforcement technology. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002523066

Macroeconomic stabilization policies in the EMU : spillovers, asymmetries, and institutions

Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni; Engwerda, Jacob Christiaan; … - 2005

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002572274

Globalization, cross-border pollution and welfare

Hatzipanayotou, Panos (contributor); … - 2005

We construct a two-good general equilibrium model of international trade for two small open economies where pollution from production is transmitted across borders. Governments in both countries impose emission taxes non-cooperatively. Within this framework, we examine the effect of trade...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003109921

Monitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting

Khalil, Fahad (contributor); Martimort, David (contributor); … - 2005

We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003113311