Similar Search Results

The quantitative view of Myerson regularity

Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora - 2016

In mechanism design, Myerson regularity is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper therefore explores the quantitative version of Myerson...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011416003

Competing with asking prices

Lester, Benjamin; Visschers, Ludo; Wolthoff, Ronald - 2016

In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011488000

An externality-robust auction : theory and experimental evidence

Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - This version: April 2014, First version: November 2013

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010347030

Keeping the agents in the dark : competing mechanisms, private disclosures, and the revelation principle

Attar, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa; Mariotti, Thomas; … - 2025

We study the design of market information in competing-mechanism games. We identify a new dimension, private disclosures, whereby the principals asymmetrically inform the agents of how their mechanisms operate. We show that private disclosures have two important effects. First, they can raise a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015427014

Security bid auctions for agency contracts

Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2013

A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227234

Auctions with signaling bidders : optimal design and information disclosure

Bos, Olivier; Pollrich, Martin - 2025

We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about … takeover bidding, charity auctions, procurement and art auctions. We show that auction revenue can be decomposed into the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015326255

Efficient incentives with social preferences

Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph - 2022

This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private … such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013255847

The design of ambiguous mechanisms

Di Tillio, Alfredo; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2014

This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399062

Selling to the mean

Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2015

We study optimal selling strategies of a seller who is poorly informed about the buyer’s value for the object. When the maxmin seller only knows that the mean of the distribution of the buyer's valuations belongs to some interval then nature can keep him to payoff zero no matter how much...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011298549

Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation

Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; Wolthoff, Ronald - 2016

the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of … be decentralized by sellers posting auctions combined with a fee that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011481312