We characterize the interplay between firms’ decision in terms of product differentiation and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. We prove the existence of a non-monotone relationship between firms’ decision at the development stage and their intertemporal preferences.

We characterize the interplay between firms’ decision in terms of product standardization and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. We prove the existence of a non-monotone relationship between firms’ decision at the product stage and their intertemporal preferences.

Advance production serves as a means of quantity commitment. Therefore, a quantity-competing firm may have an incentive to invest in advance production in order to pre-empt its opponent(s), even when [i] it is technologically more costly than on-spot production, and [ii] it does not entitle the...

In a differentiated oligopoly market, it is often the case that consumer’s ex post preferences over different product qualities depend upon the state of nature which is not yet observable to the consumers at the time of purchase. One of the most typical examples is a market for durable goods...

This paper explores an algorithm which serves as a market auctioneer under the following constraints: [i] traders arrive randomly and each sales/purchase order should be executed at the currently posted price (sequential service), [ii] the auctioneer need not know the exact fundamental value of...

We explore how an incumbent airline firm structures its route network under the threat of entry caused by deregulation. We show that entry induces the incumbent firm to strategically alter its flight operating network from a fully connected network (FC) to a hub-and-spoke network (HS). While...

I consider a two period model with an incumbent firm and a potential entrant each of whom produces a homogeneous good. There is a demand uncertainty and the information regarding the demand is asymmetric: the incumbent possesses private information concerning the state of demand while the...

The choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here. It is shown that this relocates the prisoners’ dilemma backwards, from the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion, and where discount rates appear as the...

We investigate the choice of market variable, price or quantity, of an optimal implicit cartel. If the discount factor is high, the cartel can realize the monopoly profit in both cases. Otherwise, it is optimal for the cartel to rely on quantities in the collusive phase if goods are substitutes...

Different market settings are considered in a free trade environment, where firms can choose technology, quality, and price or quantity. The shape of competition in prices requires the intervention of governments, via a common antidumping policy to make firms converge on the simultaneous...