This paper examines how different rules for presentation of evidence affect verdicts in regulatory hearings and the welfare and efficiency properties these procedures exhibit. The hearing is modeled as a game of imperfect information in which the respondent is privately informed about validity...

This paper studies the implications of non-commitment for organizational design. An organizational form must trade-off between the coordination benefits associated with the centralization of information and its associated costs in terms of renegotiation. This analysis makes precise what these...

This paper studies the effect of combining different insurance schemes on the efficiency of consumption smoothing in an environment without commitment. A savings account is introduced into the self-enforcing risk-sharing model of Thomas and Worrall (1988). The risk averse agent's savings play...

This paper surveys the major issues regarding the transferability of tax losses upon a change of control. Whether tax losses should be transferable or not depends on whether the market for corporate control is efficient or not. If there are too few efficiency-enhancing takeovers, then takeovers...

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives: (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders...

This survey presents within a single model three theories of decentralization of decision-making within organizations based on private information and incentives. Renegotiation, collusion, and limits on communication are three sufficient conditions for decentralization to be optimal. Cet article...

This paper addresses the question of whether R&D should be carried out by an independent research unit or be produced in-house by the firm marketing the innovation. We define two organizational structures. In an integrated structure, the firm that markets the innovation also carries out and...

In this paper we analyze a long-term risk-sharing contract between two risk-averse agents facing self-enforcing constraints. We enlarge the contracting space to allow for an ex ante transfer (at the beginning of the period) before the state of nature is realized. We analyze the trade-off between...