This paper reports an experimental study on three well-known solutions for problems of adjudicating con icting claims: the constrained equal-awards, the proportional, and the constrained equal-losses rules. We first let subjects play three games designed such that the unique equilibrium...

We investigate how to extend bankruptcy rules to the general setting in which agents'claims may refer to different issues. We show that the proportional rule is the only one whose extensions according to two natural procedures yield the same outcomes.

Many distributional conflicts are characterized by the presence of acquired rights. The basic structure of these conflicts is that of the so-called claims problem, in which an amount of money has to be divided among individuals with differing claims and the total amount available falls short of...

This paper considers collective decision-making when individuals are partitioned into groups (e.g., states or parties) endowed with voting weights. We study a game in which each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to the alternatives as a function of its...