We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide a political decision-maker with policy-relevant information and to exert pressure on her. Both activities are costly but may induce the lobby's preferred policy. Our paper provides an integrated analysis of both lobbying activities and...

We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the...

We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the...

We examine the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We extend the existing literature by endogenizing the reaction of the IEAs members to a deviation by a member or a group of members. We assume that when a country contemplates exiting or joining an agreement, it takes...

The paper is not intended for game theorists - unless they are interested in learning how their theories, and the theory of environmental games as developed in a forthcoming book, are being used for studying the current problem of climate change. Similarly for economists. In general, the...

In this paper we analyze the negotiation strategy of the European Union regarding the formation of an international climate agreement for the post-2012 era. We use game theoretical stability concepts to explore incentives for key players in the climate policy game to join future climate...

Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible...

Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible...

Both environmental quality and health care expenditure are determinants of health and life expectancy, but the support for them appears to be different according to the electors' age, with a relatively larger support for health expenditure among the elderly as it is generally effective on a...