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AURIOL, Emmanuelle; PICARD, Pierre M. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2011

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and firm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610448

A theory of soft capture

AGRELL, Per; GAUTIER, Axel - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2010

In this paper, wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information. In a three- tier model, a regulator is charged by a political principal to provide a signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe his type and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836131

Efficiency, access and the mixed delivery of health care services

CANTA, Chiara - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2011

The focus of this paper is on the trade-off between cost efficiency and access in the choice of the optimal mix of public and private provision in universal health systems. We model a simple health care market in which the regulator acts as a third payer. Patients need one unit of medical...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927720

Smart-grid investments, regulation and organization

AGRELL, Per; BOGETOFT, Peter - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2011

, assets and costs and contrast this with the assumptions implicit or explicit in current economic network regulation. The … regulation between a distribution system operator (DSO) and a potential investor-generation. The results from the model confirm … the hypothesis that network regulation should find a focal point, should integrate externalities in the performance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927726

Rethinking regulatory capture

AGRELL, Per J.; GAUTIER, Axel - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2012

Conventional capture models rely on the idea that regulator is induced to lenient behavior by the regulated firm through offers of monetary transfers, the bribery model, or future employment, the revolving doors model. To avoid socially costly capture, the political principal should then either...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010927734

Liberal regulation : privatization of natural monopolies with adverse selection

AURIOL, Emmanuelle; PICARD, Pierre - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2004

This paper studies the effect of soft-budget constraints in a pure adverse selection model of monopoly regulation. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008419

Regulation of an open access essential facility

GAUTIER, Axel; MITRA, Manipushpak - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003

In this paper we consider the problem of regulating an open access essential facility. A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market under the roof of a regulatory mechanism. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both competitors use...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008615

Financing infrastructure under budget constraints

GAUTIER, Axel; MITRA, Manipushpak - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2003

In this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when the regulator faces a budget constraint. The optimal budget-constrained mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient firms produce the same quantity irrespective...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042846

Upstream market foreclosure

GABSZEWICZ, Jean J.; ZANAJ, Skerdilajda - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2006

This paper investigates how an incumbent monopolist can weaken potential rivals or deter entry in the output market by manipulating the access of these rivals in the input market. We analyze two polar cases. In the ﬁrst one, the input market is assumed to be competitive with the input being...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042780

Successive oligopolies and decreasing returns

GABSZEWICZ, Jean J.; ZANAJ, Skerdilajda - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2008

In this paper, we propose an example of successive oligopolies where the downstream firms share the same decreasing returns technology of the Cobb-Douglas type. We stress the differences between the conclusions obtained under this assumption and those resulting from the traditional example...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042825