This paper investigates how the control and devolution of productive assets are allocated among husband and wife. Theory predicts that bargaining power within marriage depends on the division of assets upon divorce (exit option) and on control over assets during marriage (non-cooperative...

This paper examines the determinants of assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia. We identify and test three separate processes that determine assets brought to marriage: assortative matching; compensating parental transfers at marriage; and strategic behavior by parents. We find ample evidence for...

This paper examines the determinants of human and physical capital at marriage. Using detailed data from rural Ethiopia, we Þnd ample evidence of assortative matching at marriage. Assets brought to marriage are distributed in a highly unequal manner. Sorting operates at a variety of levels ....

This paper examines the determinants of assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia. We find ample evidence of assertive matching at marriage. Assets brought to marriage are distributed in a highly unequal manner. Sorting operates at a variety of levels - wealth, schooling, and work experience - that...